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1. Introduction 
 Peace is the key public good that a government must provide for economic 
development to take place. Without a credible perspective of lasting peace, there is no policy 
framework that can convince investors to bet on a country’s future development by investing 
in productive and largely irreversible projects. The latter would be seriously at risk if a violent 
conflict happened to break out. There is a two-way causality between the risk of civil war and 
low development, which is illustrated by the well-known fact that civil wars mainly occur in 
developing countries. Africa in particular has been the theater of many civil wars since the 
end of the cold war, while it remains the most backward continent, despite some promising 
developments in a dozen countries. Rich countries are those whose political and institutional 
development has reached a point where the risk of civil war can be neglected by investors. 
The theory of conflict-prevention has brought out the main inputs that must be 
provided by a peace-minded government. Azam (1995) describes how some redistribution of 
the resources controlled by the government must in general be combined with military 
expenditures for buying the peace. That paper is motivated by reference to various African 
countries, including some post-conflict ones like Ethiopia and Uganda in the 1990s, and some 
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others that had not experienced such conflicts at the time, like Ivory Coast and Senegal. A 
suggestive econometric analysis by Azam et al. (1996) seems to confirm this theoretical 
prediction, by showing how public expenditures with a highly redistributive content, like 
health and education, reduce significantly the occurrence of political violence.  
However, the success of such a policy is shown in that paper to rest entirely on the 
ability of the government to commit credibly to such a course of action, i.e., to act as a 
“Stackelberg leader” in game-theoretic terms. Furthermore, that paper shows that this 
condition is also required for foreign aid to be used in a social-welfare-enhancing way, rather 
than for increasing military expenditures. A related point about the link between commitment 
and peace was made independently by Fearon (1995) in a working paper applied to the war in 
Croatia in 1991-92. This point is further developed in Azam (2001) which provides a 
discussion of the various means used by African governments for making their promises 
credible. Broadly speaking, they can be grouped in two categories. The first one is comprised 
of the institutional solutions that can be used by the government for “tying its own hands”, by 
creating various kinds of “checks and balances”, including the so-called “agencies of 
restraint”. This line of argument thus shows how political and institutional development must 
go hand-in-hand with economic development. As emphasized by North (1990), the key point 
in institutional development is the provision of commitment devices that help making 
property rights and human security credible (see also, North et al., 2009). The second one 
refers to the build-up by the ruler of a credible reputation of faithfulness, based on a rigorous 
track record of keeping promises. The drawback of this second solution is that this kind of 
personalized political asset is liable to disappear when the ruler dies. The example of Ivory 
Coast is illuminating in this respect, where the political capital accumulated by President 
Houphouet-Boigny during his long stay in power got rapidly eroded after his death by his 
chosen successor, Henri Konan-Bédié. Hence, the institutional framework is the key 
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ingredient for establishing credibility in the long run, while the ruler’s reputation cannot 
outlast the latter’s lifetime. However, credible commitment is not the only problem that might 
prevent a ruler from achieving a lasting peace by combining redistribution and deterrence. 
Many other institutional weaknesses, like an inefficient public service, or a high level of 
decentralized corruption, might make peace too expensive for the ruler to invest in buying it. 
This point is illustrated below. 
Moreover, institutions cannot be built in a vacuum, and recent empirical results 
suggest that a country’s natural endowment is an important determinant of its ability to 
develop the appropriate institutional framework for making the government’s promises 
credible. Fearon (2005) thus shows empirically that oil exporters are facing special challenges 
that undermine their government’s credibility and tend to make the occurrence of civil war 
more probable in this case. Azam (2009) offers an interpretation of this phenomenon, based 
on an analytic narrative of the oil-related conflict in Nigeria. That paper describes the 
dynamics of violence in Nigeria, and shows how institutional weaknesses, like the 
governments’ corruption at both the national and the local level, eventually made the low-
intensity conflict going on under the civilian government a cheaper solution than the previous 
strategy of indiscriminate violence against civilians perpetrated by the military regime. 
Nevertheless, oil is not the only cause of civil wars in Africa, as beautifully illustrated by 
Rocco and Ballo (2008). They show how Laurent Gbagbo, who had been elected in unfair 
elections organized by the military dictator Robert Gueï in 2000, had an incentive to provoke 
a civil war in Ivory Coast in order to prevent the democratic process to resume, as he did not 
stand much chance to win a second time in normal elections. Moreover, some countries have 
managed to avoid civil war despite the importance of oil production for their economy. In 
Africa, Gabon and Cameroon have managed to remain peaceful, thanks in particular to a 
sophisticated system of centralized corruption (see e.e., Soares de Oliveira, 2007). 
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The present chapter first provides a simple theoretical framework for discussing these 
issues, in the next section. It emphasizes how the government must balance its expenditures in 
order to produce the right mix of redistribution and deterrence for establishing a lasting and 
credible peaceful equilibrium. The key contribution of this theoretical exercise is to bring out 
that high enough levels of administrative and military efficiency are required for making 
peace credible. Without them, the government’s political will to invest in peace would falter, 
opening the door to violent conflict. Hence, this model provides a theoretical underpinning for 
the recent emphasis put by the Bretton Woods institutions on institutional reconstruction in 
post-conflict countries. For example, a joint IMF-World Bank document claimed that their 
goal was to assist in rebuilding “the administrative and institutional capacity required to put a 
comprehensive economic program in place” (IMF and World Bank, 2001, pp. 8-9). It shows 
additionally that this institutional effort can usefully be complemented with a similar effort 
invested in enhancing military capacity, as a combination of the two is shown to minimize the 
cost of buying the peace. This gives this theoretical framework a clear “Hobbesian” flavor, as 
it shows that peace will generally be enforced under threat, as deterrence is a key component 
of the peace-buying equilibrium. 
Then, the subsequent section discusses various institutional solutions that have been 
tried in poor countries for overcoming the special challenges that they face for implementing 
such a policy mix. In particular, it discusses the issues of power-sharing and of federalism, 
which have been tried in the past for mitigating the war-inducing properties of majority rule in 
ethnically divided societies. The case studies briefly discussed in this section vindicate the 
theoretical prediction mentioned above that weak administrative efficiency might prevent the 
best intentioned political reforms from delivering the peace. This provides also some support 
to the idea advocated by Paris (2004) that strengthening administrative capacity should be 
given priority over democratization or other forms of political liberalization. The key warning 
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brought out here is that there is a delicate balance to be found between deterrence and credible 
redistribution for buying the peace. In addition, these case studies suggest that the simple two-
player model described below needs to be extended in one crucial dimension for shedding 
light on many African cases of conflict prevention by looking at the shifting pattern of ethnic 
alliances. They show that a balance of force is a key ingredient in making the peaceful 
equilibrium credible. 
 
2. A Sketch of Conflict-Prevention Theory 
 Peace is not the natural state of affairs, and it is a costly public good to produce. It 
requires two inputs for its production, namely deterrence and redistribution (see e.g., Azam, 
1995, 2006). The present section sketches the theory of conflict prevention as a two-stage 
game between a ruler and a potential rebel: (i) at stage 1, the ruler chooses between war and 
peace; (ii) at stage 2, if peace is chosen, the ruler chooses the cost-minimizing mix of 
deterrence and redistribution that can enforce the peace, taking due account of the potential 
rebel’s participation constraint. The game is solved by backward induction, as stage 2 
determines the cost of peace for the ruler, which is then compared to the cost of war for 
making stage 1 decision. This approach describes the two sides of the game as unitary players, 
without any collective action problem. This simplification is discussed below. Notice that this 
framework gives the ruler the leading role, yielding a clear attribution of responsibility for the 
war/peace outcome. By contrast, the rebel-centered approach advocated by Collier (2000) and 
World Bank (2003) exonerates the government, but it seems quite tautological. It basically 
claims that there is a civil war because there are rebels, while you can as plausibly claim that 
there are rebels because there is a civil war. As emphasized and illustrated by Bates (2008), 
government-centered approaches have a much better explanatory power. They put the so-
called “political will” at the center stage, but they do not assume that this could be 
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exogenously given. They bring out instead some deeper parameters which are liable to make 
it flip on the side of peace, or otherwise. 
 The Equilibrium Level of Deterrence 
 A clear distinction must be made between defense and deterrence. The former refers to 
the amount of military expenditures that the ruler would use if he chose to wage the war 
against the potential rebels. By definition, in this case, the ruler would not invest in military 
expenditures and redistribution up to the point where the potential opponent would be 
discouraged from launching a rebellion. In particular, the ruler would not give any transfer to 
his opponent. By contrast, if the ruler chose to enforce the peace instead, then he could invest 
in an even larger level of military expenditures, in some cases, with a view to deter his 
potential opponents from putting out a challenge against his rule. This is deterrence, and it can 
take different forms. Azam and Hoeffler (2002) have shown how indiscriminate violence 
against civilians might be used to weaken the potential rebels’ ability to fight, and thus to 
reduce their incentive to launch an insurgency in the first place. Azam and Saadi-Sedik (2004) 
analyze instead the case of a threat of sanctions. Then, the sanctions will only be implemented 
if they are not effective at deterring the potential opponent from putting out a challenge. In 
either case, defense refers to military expenditures incurred for being used at fighting, while 
deterrence refers to military expenditures that are incurred for avoiding the fight, i.e., for 
convincing the potential opponent to accept the peace rather than to launch an insurgency.  
Let a  be the size of the army that the ruler chooses for maintaining the peace, which is 
generally different from the level of defense expenditures that he would choose were he to go 
for the war instead. Many exogenous factors may affect the ruler’s efficiency at deterrence, 
including the geographical or cultural setting prevailing in the country. Mountainous terrain or 
a deep rainforest are some features that can make rebellion more difficult to deter, while some 
traditional political systems, like a caste system or a deeply rooted hierarchy, might make 
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deterrence cheaper than in some other systems (see e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003). We use the 
parameter θ  for capturing this deterrence efficiency.  
The ruler can also use redistribution as a way to buy the peace, by offering an implicit 
or explicit contract promising to give the potential rebel an amount g  if he refrained from 
getting armed and thus challenging the ruler. To be effective, the latter transfer must give the 
potential rebel a level of satisfaction at least as high as his expected gain in case of war. 
Define ( ),E a θ  as the potential rebel’s expected gain in case of war. It is naturally assumed 
to be decreasing with the ruler’s effort at deterrence a  and its efficiency level θ . Let 
( ), 0aE a θ <  denote its partial derivative with respect to a . Then, in order for the transfer g  
to buy the peace, it must fulfill the potential rebel’s participation constraint: 
( ),g E a θ≥ .          (1) 
If condition (1) did not hold, then the rebel would be better off launching an 
insurgency, and war would ensue. This condition just says that (i) the potential rebel must get 
in case of peace at least as much as he could expect to get in case of war, and that (ii) the 
minimum transfer required to buy the peace is a decreasing function of the rulers’ effort and 
efficiency at deterrence. This participation constraint is thus facing the ruler with a trade off 
between spending more on transfer and spending more on deterrence. Because g  is a cost 
item for the ruler, this condition will hold as an equality in equilibrium. The ruler has no 
reason to make any gift to the potential rebels over and above the transfer required to buy the 
peace, so that ( ),E a θ  gives the equilibrium value of the peace-buying transfer.  
This very simple setting allows us to establish the following striking result: 
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Neo-Hobbesian Theorem: If (i) ( ),E a θ  is strictly convex in a  and (ii) it is such that 
( )0, 1aE θ < − , then the ruler will choose a strictly positive level of deterrence for enforcing 
the peace at a minimum cost. 
 
Proof: Condition (i) is required as a second-order condition for the ruler to minimize the cost 
of peace g a+  subject to the potential rebel’s participation constraint (1). Condition (ii) 
ensures that the first-order condition for this minimization problem ( ), 1aE a θ = −  holds for a 
strictly positive value of a , denoted *a . QED. 
 
 This theorem is clearly reminiscent of Hobbes’ Leviathan theory, which asserts that a 
despotic power is required to pull out human society from the natural state, i.e., a kind of 
anarchy where life is “nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 1651). The peace-time positive 
level of deterrence implies that the peace is somehow built on the threat of war. This was 
captured in the antique world by the Latin saying: “si vis pacem, para bellum” (if you want 
peace, prepare for war). On the upside, this theorem also shows that there is a tradeoff 
between redistribution and deterrence, suggesting that the ruler can also use the “carrot” 
beside the necessary “stick” for enforcing the peace, thus mitigating the role of fear.  
 The Choice between War and Peace 
 We now turn our attention to the first stage of the game, where the ruler chooses 
between war and peace, by considering the relative cost of the two options. Let us introduce 
an additional transaction cost 0γ >  that the ruler must incur in order to get its optimal peace-
buying expenditures, denoted *a  and *g , through the system. This parameter captures 
potentially a lot of the typical institutional problems faced by rulers in developing countries. 
The public administration might be highly inefficient, involving a heavy burden in various 
forms of leakages (corruption, overstaffing, etc.). The payment system might be deficient, so 
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that a lot of intermediaries would need to be defrayed for channeling the funds either to the 
army, for implementing the deterrence policy, or to the potential rebels, for the redistribution 
part of the peace-buying policy. Howe (2001) has illustrated how the line separating 
deterrence from redistribution is sometimes hard to draw. He gives some examples where the 
Nigerian generals buy out-of-order tanks in order to maximize the kickback that they get from 
their suppliers. A particular attention has been paid in the literature to credibility problems 
(Azam, 1995, 2006a, Fearon, 1995, 1998). If the commitment technology available to the 
ruler is deficient, with a non-zero probability of default, then a risk premium needs to be 
added on top of the regular expenses in order to compensate for the resulting credibility gap. 
This can also be captured by our simple transaction-cost setting. Then, the total cost of peace 
is ( )( )1 * *a gγ+ + . This is compared to the cost of war, assumed to be exogenously fixed at 
ω , including maybe some war-specific transaction costs, for choosing between war and 
peace. Then, peace will prevail if: 
 ( ) ( )( )1 * *,a E aγ θ ω+ + ≤ .        (2) 
 Condition (2) thus defines a cutoff line between war and peace, which figure 1 depicts 
in a plausible way in the { },γ θ  space, for a given value of ω . War is chosen by the ruler 
whenever the transaction cost for buying the peace is too high, i.e., for any point located 
above this cutoff line. The latter’s positive slope means that for any given level of 
administrative inefficiency, you can eliminate the risk of war if you are efficient enough at 
deterrence. Its convex shape means that when the ruler is very efficient at deterrence, then this 
can make peace attractive for him even if administrative inefficiency is extremely high. Its 
positive intercept suggests that peace would prevail independently of the ruler’s level of 
efficiency at deterrence, were the transaction cost of delivering the peace-buying money 
negligible. This is a property shared by most conflict models, although there are exceptions. It 
is a reflection of the heavy social cost of war, which is liable to destroy a lot of valuable 
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resources. Then, peace helps save a bonus for the ruler after compensating the potential rebel 
for his opportunity cost of accepting the peace. Hence, were the transfer costless, it would 
generally make peace preferable for him. 
 
Figure 1: The Choice between War and Peace 
 
 Figure 1 provides a simple tool for analyzing the causes of war and peace. It brings out 
the two key parameters that determine the ruler’s choice between war and peace. The crucial 
role of the transaction-cost parameter γ  emphasizes the theoretical point that any model that 
can predict the occurrence of a violent conflict as an equilibrium outcome has to violate the 
conditions for the Coase theorem to prevail. The latter asserts that in the absence of any 
transactions costs, the free bargaining between the players would result in an optimal 
outcome, irrespective of the precise initial allocation of property rights, provided that the 
latter were well defined and freely transferable across players. Conflict theory deals precisely 
with the cases where property rights can be challenged with some probability of success (see 
Skaperdas, 1992). This is a type of negative externality that a Coasian bargain could handle, 






 Figure 1 brings out also the key role of the θ  parameter, which measures the ruler’s 
efficiency at deterrence. In Africa, democratic regimes have usually found this part of the 
peace-keeping policy mix difficult to handle, in particular because of the difficult task of 
controlling the army in such cases. Military regimes are less reluctant to use indiscriminate 
violence against civilians as a pre-emptive counter-insurgency strategy, and as such are more 
effective at ruling by fear. This sheds some light on the recent experience of Guinea. Under 
the aging autocrat Lansana Conté, the Guinean government was loosing its ability to make 
credible promises, as the days of the ruler seemed to come to an end. A fairly erratic policy 
emerged in the key field of allocating the revenues from the mining sector. This country relies 
heavily on bauxite and gold as its dominant exports. A lot of political agitation ensued, ending 
up in a brutal repression of demonstrations, which left on one occasion more 200 dead 
civilians in Conakry in 2007. Then, when the old man passed out in December 2008, a 
bloodless coup occurred, which brought to power some military officers who had made a 
name for themselves during these episodes of brutal repression.  Peace was maintained by 
fear, but this example illustrates vividly how figure 1 can be used to shed some light on some 
countries’ response to exogenous shocks. It is almost definitional that a fragile state is a 
peaceful country whose { },γ θ  pair lies very close to the upward-sloping cutoff line, making 
the temptation of civil war very strong. Any odd shock could then break the peaceful 
equilibrium and precipitate the outbreak of violence. Political unrest was building up as γ  
was gradually moving upwards during the final years of the Conté regime. Then, the army 
took over in order to overcome the constitutional process and destroy any kind of restraint that 
had been put on repression in the previous years. This increase in θ  turned out to be sufficient 
for compensating for the deterioration in γ  and to maintain the peace.  
 The next section illustrates how this simple framework is shedding some light on 
many instances of political developments that took place in Africa under the shadow of civil 
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war. Following Azam (2006a), they illustrate how thin is the line between war and peace in 
this continent. Moreover, they show the limits of the unitary agent simplification, which needs 
to be relaxed for taking due account of the shifting ethnic alliances that seem to be needed for 
the transition from war to peace in Africa. 
 
3. Institutional Development in the Hobbesian Tropics 
 The need for setting up a credible institutional framework for peace as a prerequisite 
for economic and political development is strikingly illustrated by the case of Chad. There, 
sizable oil reserves were discovered in the wake of the 1974 oil shock, but they were only 
exploited in 2003. In the words of Azam and Djimtoïngar (2008): “It is only after peace was 
secured, and institutions were put in place to make it credible, that foreign oil companies 
ventured into exploiting oil” (Azam and Djimtoïngar, 2008, p.87). Hence, the oil reserves 
remained in the ground for nearly three decades while the oil companies were waiting for the 
Chadians to sort out their political problem. This hold-out attitude by the Western oil firms 
was possible because of the lack of external competition. In Sudan, Jok (2007) shows how an 
attempt to hold out made by the Canadian firm Talisman Energy Inc. failed to protect human 
rights because it was instantly replaced by the Chinese and Malaysian oil companies. In Chad, 
the technical problems were solved very quickly as soon as the oil companies decided that the 
time was ripe for exploiting the oil, and the pipe-line across Cameroon was built in a few 
months. The kind of wait-and-see attitude that this example epitomizes is a characteristic of 
many other potential investors in Africa, and more generally in developing countries. It can be 
taken as good indicator of the credibility of the ruling political equilibrium. The key issue 
then is to identify what political development made the institutional framework credible 
enough to convince the potential investors to cross the line and start building up some 
productive capacity in the country. A careful analysis of the Chadian case illustrates how the 
political equilibrium rests in fact on the balance of forces between the ethnic groups involved. 
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The Interest Groups behind the Institutions 
This issue has been discussed intensively in the historical literature devoted to 
European development. The famous paper by North and Weingast (1989) demonstrates how 
the constitution that emerged from the “Glorious Revolution” (1688) in England imposed 
enough restraint on the subsequent kings to provide a fairly safe environment for investors, 
which led eventually to the so-called “Industrial Revolution”. However, Stasavage (2003) 
shows that this constitutional framework provides only one side of the story, while the 
balance of forces within the resulting parliament was in fact the mainstay of the subsequent 
investor-friendly environment. Similarly, in developing countries nowadays, constitutional or 
other institutional frameworks are just empty shells unless they are a reflection of a balance of 
forces between the main interest groups. This is why the Neo-Conservative agenda of 
democratizing across the board has led to many political disasters: institutions are largely 
endogenous, and reflect the peaceful or violent interaction between well-defined groups. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) have provided the fundamental analysis of the determinants 
of dictatorship and democracy in an economy where income distribution is the main issue. 
However, in Africa and many other developing countries, groups are defined along ethnic or 
religious lines, and different solutions have to be devised. Then, majority rule does not 
necessarily create the right environment, as it might result in a dictatorship of the majority, 
entailing a potential exclusion of minority groups, which are then cornered into violent 
rebellion. Fearon (1998) shows how the prospect of majority rule might trigger a violent 
conflict in an ethnically divided country. An illuminating linguistic analysis by Shaffer (1998) 
of the word “democracy” in the Wolof language in Senegal strongly suggests that majority 
rule is not an aim in itself for the African population. The latter seem to adhere spontaneously 
to the view held by Classical Liberalism of democracy as government by discussion, whose 
aim is really to build up a consensus rather than to exclude minority viewpoints. Azam 
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(2006a) provides a different analysis of endogenous political regimes aimed at capturing 
better the stakes of the political game in African society. That model brings out the 
fundamental determinants of the choice between war and peace, on the one hand, and in case 
of peace, the choice between a redistributive regime and a military dictatorship, on the other 
hand. In particular, it shows how the relative endowments of the ethnic groups interact with 
the government’s credibility for determining the equilibrium political regime. 
 Two main types of institutional frameworks have been tried in Africa for creating the 
required “checks and balances” for enhancing the credibility of the government’s promises to 
redistribute across ethnic groups, namely federalism and power-sharing agreements. 
However, the examples discussed below suggest that such schemes might not deliver the 
required credibility when other forms of institutional weaknesses interfere with the smooth 
working of the redistribution scheme so that the money does not reach the target population.  
The recent experience of Kenya, in March and April 2008, illustrates vividly the dead-
end where a narrow-minded application of the Neo-Conservative doctrine can lead a country. 
While the minority government ran by Daniel Arap Moi since the late 1970s had managed to 
keep the country together, with limited violence, a blunt application of majority rule resulted 
predictably in the eruption of widespread violence. Moi was a Kalendjin, from a very small 
ethnic group renown for the numerous gold medals it won for Kenya at the Olympic games. 
He was thus missing the kind of popular mass-support that rulers from large ethnic groups 
enjoy. His ability to stay in power thus rested on his strategy of keeping a fair balance in the 
distribution of the spoils between the larger ethnic groups, mainly via their elites. In the words 
of Kimenyi and Ndung’u (2005): “The multiethnic ruling class did not break ranks, so we did 
not see a strong elite movement to forge an ethnically based rebel group” (Kimenyi and 
Ndung’u, 2005, p. 154). Moi’s weakness as an ethnic leader was thus a key ingredient for 
making his promises credible. Under the intrusive influence of the US administration, 
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represented in that case by Colin Powell, a majority government was put in place in the early 
2000s. The latter government was entirely dominated by the largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu. 
Unfortunately, majority rule was then interpreted as a license to exclude from power the other 
large ethnic group, the Luo. The latter remained relatively calm during the first term of the 
Kikuyu regime, waiting for “their turn at the trough”. However, the 2008 elections brought 
the incumbent coalition back to power, raising the prospect of another term of exclusion for 
the Luo. This led to a popular uprising, leaving a long trail of innocent victims behind. The 
ensuing popular violence could only be stopped by over-ruling the election results, and 
organizing a power-sharing scheme including representatives of the Luo minority. Sheer 
common sense thus managed to beat the Neo-Conservative dogma and to bring peace back. 
Chad provides a more dramatic example where power-sharing succeeded in ending 
decades of violence and to convince investors as mentioned above. Because the resulting 
political equilibrium has been in place for nearly two decades, its analysis is liable to provide 
some additional insight on the conditions for such a scheme to succeed. A closely related 
analysis could be made of the case of post-conflict Uganda, where Museveni’s NRM 
established a controversial form of inclusive “democracy”, which presided over an economic 
recovery that was regarded as an example for the whole continent by the international 
community (Mutibwa, 1992).  Most ethnic groups were then represented in government, with 
the exception of a small northern rebellion. 
In Chad, the Southerners ruled the country from Independence to the civil war, under a 
single-party regime. Ever since 1965, a low intensity insurrection had been going on in the 
north, structured by the Frolinat (Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad), a rebellion led by 
the two Toubou rivals Goukouni Oueddeï and Hissein Habré. Goukouni is the son of the 
Gedré, the highest traditional authority of his group, while Habré is from a lower caste of the 
same group, the Goranne. Habré was in turn the last prime minister before the civil war, after 
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a coup had toppled François Tombalbaye’s dictatorial government, and the second president 
of the post-war period, until 1990. This occurred when the victorious northerners began to 
rule the country, after a short interim leadership of Goukouni. The latter had developed some 
very close relationships with the Libyan ruler Khadafi, while the former was an inflexible 
nationalist, who always fought hard to keep Khadafi out of Chad. This got him at times a 
serious US support, providing France with a competitive pressure to adopt a firm stance over 
these matters. The latter provided him with the required military support, delivering arms and 
a discrete help with ‘technical advisors’, when it came to push the Libyan army out of the 
country. Habré lost the French support by selling the captured high-tech Soviet military 
hardware to the US in 1987, without letting the French have a look at it. He was thus dumped 
by Paris when his former ally Idriss Déby launched an attack from the Sudanese territory, and 
seized N’Djamena very quickly in 1990.  
The latter comes from the Zarghawa group, whose territory lies on both sides of the 
Sudanese border, with only about 30 to 40 % of its population living inside Chad, and the rest 
in the Darfur region of neighboring Sudan. His presidential guard has thus been staffed up to 
now with a large proportion of Sudanese Arab-speaking elite soldiers. The Zarghawa are 
Muslim Arab speakers, with natural relations with the Goranne. After the civil war, the 
country was not immediately peaceful. Beside the Libyan failed invasion mentioned above, 
this period saw a lot of military activity. The “codos” rebellion movements emerged in the 
south, from 1983 to 1986, and then from 1992 to 1999. This triggered two massive waves of 
very harsh repression by the Habré government first, and then by the Idriss Déby one. This 
involved a lot of massacre of innocent civilians, many villages being burnt to ashes and 
deleted from the map. Buijtenhuijs (1998) does not hesitate to characterize these massacres as 
“genocidal”. He estimates that more than 1000 southerners have been killed every year during 
those two episodes. Moreover, over-armed herdsmen from the north, where most of the 
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fighting took place for more than a decade, started to cross the Chari river in order to feed 
their cattle in the cotton fields, shooting dead with impunity the resisting farmers. Neither the 
administration, nor the judicial authority, now dominated by the northerners, would take any 
action against this type of roving banditry, because quite a lot of these cattle are in fact owned 
by high-ranking officials. Thus, crime became “the continuation of war by other means” in 
the south. There are no precise estimates of the number of southern peasants who have 
emigrated to neighboring Cameroon, Central African Republic, and Nigeria. However, to the 
surprise of most observers, the northerners got the majority in the electoral census prior to the 
1996 elections (see Buijtenhuijs, 1998). Some claim that many farmers have deserted their 
fields because of this threat, and that this is the root cause of the ending of the post-
devaluation cotton-led boom. No data is available to examine statistically the exact 
significance of these claims, as most of these assaults are left unreported. 
The Key to the Balance of Forces 
Nevertheless, the Déby regime is rightly regarded as a more satisfactory regime, which 
lives on since 1990. The key to its relative success is that it has established some regional 
balance at the head of the state. Déby chose Kamougué, the General who organized the 
resistance in the south, during the civil war and the subsequent massacres, as the president of 
the national assembly. This is formally the second position in the state hierarchy. Moreover, 
all the military units of the southern rebellion were not dismantled, but were instead enrolled 
in the Chadian army. Thus, Kamougué represented a genuine personal power, as he could 
mobilize several military units in case of need. This ability to strike back that Déby left to the 
Southerners is a key commitment device for convincing the latter that he would leave them a 
fair share of the oil revenues, as they could thus punish him for defaulting, in the off-
equilibrium path. Azam (2006b) provides a theoretical analysis of this kind of strategy. In the 
terms of figure 1, Déby thus chose to emphasize a cut in γ , while probably reducing θ  too, 
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albeit after a brutal massacre in the south, suggesting that the cutoff line was pretty flat in the 
relevant neighborhood. In addition, some decentralization was adopted with the new 
constitution approved by referendum on March 31, 1996. Three levels of local governments 
were created on the French pattern, with communes (both rural and urban) at the bottom, 
departments at the intermediate level, and regions. Hence, Déby based his peace-keeping 
strategy partly on credible power-sharing with the southerners, and succeeded thus in halting 
the downward spiral that characterized this economy before the civil war. The economy 
recovered partly, with some positive growth of per capita GDP at local constant prices in the 
1990s. In the oil sector at least, investors then recovered enough confidence to launch the 
exploitation of the oil fields, more than 25 years after their discovery. This strategy of 
regional balance was reinforced in April 2001 by the selection as prime minister of Nagoum 
Yamassoum, a southerner, while Déby was re-elected in May 2001, with 67.35 % of the 
votes. The irruption of the oil money in the public coffers starting in 2003 did not trigger a 
new round of political violence for determining the shares of the spoils going to each group. 
The Chadian national assembly had passed a law on December 30, 1998, aiming at providing 
various guarantees about the use of the oil money. It allocated the various direct or indirect 
revenues from oil to different accounts in the government budget, in an attempt to avoid 
sneaky diversions of this money and created a watchdog committee, called the “Collège de 
Contrôle et de Surveillance des Ressources Pétrolières” for monitoring the use of this oil 
money. A law passed on June 21, 2000, reinforced the presence of civil society in this 
supervision committee, beside the representatives of the parliament, the central bank and the 
treasury, the Supreme Court, etc.  
Nevertheless, peace and the enforceability of this legal device are jointly determined. 
So far, the peace between the former two enemies, the Muslim Northerners and the Christian 
Southerners has survived. However, some sporadic violence remained in some parts of the 
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country, epitomized by the killing of the chief of staff of the Chadian army in an ambush in 
the north of the country in early 2001. More recently, a new kind of military activity has 
erupted, as some members of Déby’s family, two of his nephews in particular, have tried to 
topple him with some support from Sudan’s president Al Bachir. Then, the World Bank 
rightly allowed Idriss Déby to use some of the oil money that was kept in store for the future 
generations to be used for stepping up military expenditures and to defeat the rebels. This is a 
different kind of political violence, which erupted inside the ruling group and is based on a 
disagreement over the credible redistribution policy that bought peace for nearly two decades.  
Power-Sharing seems to reach its limits when a peaceful institutional framework must 
be put in place in a large country, with many ethnic groups to care for. Federalism then 
provides an attractive solution, which was applied successfully in post-war Ethiopia. There, 
the victorious Tigrayans subdivided the country into a large number of ethnically 
homogenous provinces, after about three decades of civil war that ended in 1991. Moreover, 
the victorious Tigrayian army did not dismantle and demobilize the whole defeated Amhara 
dominated one. On the contrary, many units of it were kept and merged with some units from 
the Tigrayian guerilla to build the new Ethiopian army, while some of the victors were asked 
simply to go back to their mountains. Like the Chadian example mentioned above, the 
Ethiopian experience supports the view that disarming the defeated side is not a clever thing 
to do for establishing a long-lasting peace. A more balanced outcome, where the new army is 
comprised of units from the two sides, seems preferable. For nearly two decades now, civil 
peace has prevailed, while a short war against Eritrea broke out in the mean time. Similarly, 
the Malian government gave a lot of autonomy to the northern people after the low-intensity 
civil war that took place in the first half of the 1990s. Like in the Chadian and the Ethiopian 
cases, the Malian government enrolled many former Tuareg rebels in its regular army. The 
attraction of federalism or regional autonomy comes from the fact that it gives local elites 
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some power for dealing with a large part of their ethnic group’s affairs. This is supposed to 
ease tensions, by mediating the relationships between the local ethnic group and the central 
government’s administration, which is often perceived as alien by the local people. Moreover, 
it keeps the local elites busy, detracting their attention away from the central government and 
the potentially disrupting competition for its control. This reduces mechanically the stakes 
involved in nation-wide politics and thus reduces the risk of a major intra-state conflict. 
 
4. Crossing the Line Back to Violence in Nigeria 
However, the Nigerian example suggests that there are additional institutional 
conditions for the federal solution to buy the peace. From independence to the civil war, 
Nigeria was divided administratively into three regions, each relying mainly on its own 
resources. The North had cotton and groundnuts; the West had cocoa, rubber, timber, palm 
oil, as well as the services of the port of Lagos. Finally the East had palm oil and petroleum. 
The Biafra war prompted the government to nationalize the oil, by the 1969 Petroleum Act, 
with a view to manage centrally the redistribution of oil revenues between regions. A 
presidential decree of 1975 further increased the central government’s share, in the midst of 
the oil boom, from 50 % to 80 %. A further step in the appropriation of oil resources by the 
central government was taken in 1978 by the Land Use Decree, which gave the right to the 
local governors, then military appointees, to expropriate any local community of their land in 
order to ease the job of oil- or mining companies (Ghazvinian, 2007). At the same time, the 
military government aimed at weakening the regional powers by subdividing the regions into 
twelve states with very limited powers. By 1991, there were thirty states in Nigeria, while 
popular violence was rising in many places, demanding the creation of additional states 
(Gboyega, 1997). Most of the time, these popular uprisings were triggered by a sense of 
unfairness by some minority ethnic groups, which were looking for the creation of new states 
where they would become dominant. These demands were in fact largely ignored by the 
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military government. Rustad (2008) remarks: “… many states borders are not drawn along 
ethnic lines, but are rather creating multiethnic states” (p.24). The current number of states, 
i.e., 36, was reached in 1996. Moreover, quite a lot of the political debate got crystallized on 
the allocation formula for allocating revenues to the states and the different levels of 
government. As emphasized by Gboyega (1997), violence grew steadily all along the period 
of military government, with a particular concentration in the Niger Delta states, where oil 
production is located. The military government mainly relied on repression and indiscriminate 
violence against civilians for containing the popular discontent. Azam (2009) provides an 
analytic narrative of this violence and its consequences. 
 The Decentralized Corruption Barrier 
 In fact, federalism does not seem to have reduced the tensions in Nigeria. Its key 
drawback was dramatically brought out after the 1999 elections, which started the return to 
civilian rule. A former general and hero of the Biafran war, Olusegun Obasanjo, won these 
elections and benefited initially from a very favorable popular opinion. Despite his Yoruba 
origin, Obasanjo has acquired a truly national reputation, and he is rejected by the most 
radical members of his own ethnic group. He first ruled the country from 1976 to 1979, as a 
military president, and organized a first handover to a civilian government in 1979. This gave 
him a credible democratic legitimacy, reinforced by the few months that he spent in jail under 
General Abacha’s dictatorship. He started to signal his drive for solving the main political 
problem of Nigeria, namely the violence going on in the oil-producing states, by reducing the 
use of violence and relying more on redistribution. He fired many generals of the previous 
period, and took various measures for curbing the power of the military. Then, he tried to 
increase the role of redistribution by increasing the share of oil revenues going back to the oil-
producing states through the so-called derivation fund from 3 % to 13 %. Unfortunately, the 
level of corruption prevailing at the state government’s level, where this revenue flow is 
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going, is such that very little of that money trickles down to the local population. Hence, this 
move failed to buy the peace in the oil-producing states, not because Obasanjo was not 
trustworthy, but because he turned out to be unable to overcome the corruption barrier that 
prevented the money from reaching its targets.  
 A highly revealing event clearly illustrates Obasanjo’s conciliatory strategy. During 
the 2000s, the most dangerous rebellion going on in Nigeria was due to the Ijaws, the most 
important ethnic group of the Niger Delta states. Although it is a fairly small group by its size, 
it is the fourth largest one in Nigeria, after the Hausa, the Yoruba and the Igbo. During the 
summer 2004, an Ijaw youth movement had turned into an armed rebellion comprised of 
about 2000 men, under Dokubo Asari’s leadership. His financial resources were mainly 
coming from “bunkering”, i.e., the theft of kerosene from the pipe-lines for smuggling the 
resulting fuel out to the world market, through some well-organized illegal networks.  The 
rebellion had managed to take over Port Harcourt in August 2004, despite the intervention of 
the Nigerian army’s helicopters, which led to the death of several hundred people. In order to 
solve speedily this problem, under the discrete pressure of the US government, Obasanjo 
invited Asari at Aso Rock, the presidential palace in Abuja. The two men found an agreement 
while an American official was present as a witness, according to which Asari was “selling” 
to Obasanjo his movement’s weapons (mainly a few AK 47s) for one million US $ according 
to the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2006). Asari committed to stop his rebellion in return 
for a general amnesty and the promise not to be attacked by the Nigerian army (Ghazvinian, 
2007). This seems to stretch credulity, at least for a Western economist, but this agreement 
succeeded in stopping this episode of violence, and permitted the resumption of oil 
production.   
 This genuinely African approach proved to be more effective than the increase in the 
derivation fund mentioned above. The country’s federal structure had been devised by the 
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military governments as a way to buy off the local elites for diverting their political ambition 
away from the central government. This entails that the bulk of the money flowing to the 
states’ governments is diverted by the governors in favor of their close clientele (Ghazvinian, 
2007). Hence, the social cost of redistribution in favor of the rebels or their supporters, i.e.,γ  
in the theoretical model above, is very high in Nigeria. Obasanjo probably had underestimated 
it at the beginning of his term in office. Finally, Asari ended up in jail, suggesting that the 
limits of the conciliatory approach have been reached (ICG, 2006).  
 War is Cheaper 
Consequently, the respite was short-lived, and violence resumed in the course of 2005-
2006. Ghazvinian cites an estimate of 1000 death per year, a figure which cannot be verified. 
Eventually, the conflict in the Niger Delta states saw its intensity rise over that period, as 
deterrence had been rolled back by the civilian government, while redistribution turned out to 
be out of reach. This conflict can be analyzed as a reciprocal-looting one of the type described 
by Azam (2002). The rebels are stealing a lot of fuel that is sold on the black market to some 
well-organized networks, which dispatch it all over West Africa and further, and they top up 
their financial resources by kidnapping some of the oil-firms’ employees for a ransom. The 
government and the oil firms are destroying more and more the environment in the Niger 
Delta states, for saving money on the required investments for reducing oil spills and gas 
flaring. This reduces the local population’s ability to make a living in legal activities like 
agriculture and fishing, strengthening their incentive to steal fuel from the pipe-lines. This 
phenomenon is described in game-theoretic terms as “strategic complementarity”, as the 
looting performed by one side is reinforcing the incentive to loot faced by the other side, 
creating a multiplier effect (Azam, 2002). Then, the oil firms have not much incentive left to 
invest resources in pollution control, and they have in fact reduced their activity in the most 
exposed areas. The shortfall of Nigerian oil production below the trend is estimated at about 
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25 %, with a potential impact on the world market price. The oil firms have responded by 
relocating an increasing fraction of their African oil production, thanks to the recent 
developments in the deep-water offshore extraction technology. Angola is now about to 
become the largest African oil producer, a position that Nigeria held for decades. This brings 
out how institutional deficiencies, like the widespread corruption that plagues the Nigerian 




 This chapter has first developed a theoretical framework for explaining how 
institutional weaknesses and low military power can combine to prevent peace from 
prevailing in a country. This game-theoretic model shows how a peace-seeking government 
would combine deterrence and redistribution for producing peace, regarded as a costly public 
good. Moreover, it shows that a low level of institutional efficiency may be an incentive for 
the government to give up conflict prevention, unless its efficiency at deterrence is high 
enough. Hence, this model shows that the government is ultimately responsible for the choice 
between war and peace, while the rebellion that it might face is just the predictable response 
to its decision.  
 Then, the chapter has shown how the balance of forces behind the main political 
institutions plays the key role for making peace durable. The discussion has centered on two 
oil-producing countries, namely Chad and Nigeria. Chad came out of three decades of civil 
war, and enjoyed a lasting peace for nearly two decades when Idriss Déby took over and 
offered a credible power-sharing agreement to the southern rebels’ leader. What made that 
agreement credible was that a balance of forces was kept behind the institutional arrangement. 
The rebels’ army was not entirely dismantled, and some of its units were merged in the 
national army. This gave the former rebel general Kamougué the power to strike back in case 
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of cheating, which made Idriss Déby’s promises to redistribute some of the oil money 
credible. By contrast, in Nigeria, the federal system implemented by the military governments 
turned out to be unable to buy the peace. With the return of civilian rule under Obasanjo, there 
were hopes that a less violent regime would emerge. Obasanjo’s good reputation and 
democratic credentials turned out to be unable to overcome the institutional weaknesses of the 
Nigerian federal system. Corruption being rampant at each level of government, Obasanjo’s 
attempt at implementing a redistribution strategy turned out to be impotent, and violence built 
up relative to the military governments’ era. In the end, the country is affected by widespread 
violence, and its development prospects are threatened. 
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